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Robust Multidimensional Mean-Payoff Games
are Undecidable
Yaron Velner
The Blavatnik School of Computer Science, Tel Aviv University, Israel
Abstract. Mean-payoff games play a central role in quantitative syn-
thesis and verification. In a single-dimensional game a weight is assigned
to every transition and the objective of the protagonist is to assure a non-
negative limit-average weight. In the multidimensional setting, a weight
vector is assigned to every transition and the objective of the protagonist
is to satisfy a boolean condition over the limit-average weight of each di-
mension, e.g., LimAvg(x1) ≤ 0 ∨ LimAvg(x2) ≥ 0 ∧ LimAvg(x3) ≥ 0.
We recently proved that when one of the players is restricted to finite-
memory strategies then the decidability of determining the winner is
inter-reducible with Hilbert’s Tenth problem over rationals (a funda-
mental long-standing open problem). In this work we consider arbitrary
(infinite-memory) strategies for both players and show that the problem
is undecidable.
1 Introduction
Two-player games on graphs provide the mathematical foundation for the study
of reactive systems. In these games, the set of vertices is partitioned into player-
1 and player-2 vertices; initially, a pebble is placed on an initial vertex, and in
every round, the player who owns the vertex that the pebble resides in, advances
the pebble to an adjacent vertex. This process is repeated forever and give rise
to a play that induces an infinite sequence of edges. In the quantitative frame-
work, an objective assigns a value to every play, and the goal of player 1 is to
assure a value of at least ν to the objective. In order to have robust quantitative
specifications, it is necessary to investigate games on graphs with multiple (and
possibly conflicting) objectives. Typically, multiple objectives are modeled by
multidimensional weight functions (e.g., [4,5,7,1]), and the outcome of a play is
a vector of values (r1, r2, . . . , rk). A robust specification is a boolean formula over
the atoms ri ∼ νi, for ∼∈ {≤, <,≥, >}, i ∈ {1, . . . , k} and νi ∈ Q. For example,
ϕ = ((r1 ≥ 9 ∨ r2 ≤ 9) ∧ r3 < 0 ∧ r4 > 9). The most well studied quantitative
metric is the mean-payoff objective, which assigns the limit-average (long-run
average) weight to an infinite sequence of weights (and if the limit does not ex-
ist, then we consider the limit infimum of the sequence). In this setting, ri is the
limit-average of dimension i of the weight function, and the goal of player 1 is to
satisfy the boolean condition. In this work we prove that determining whether
player 1 can satisfy such a condition is undecidable.
2Related work. The model checking problem (one-player game) for such objec-
tives (with some extensions) was considered in [1,6,3,11,12] and decidability was
established. Two-player games for restricted subclasses that contain only con-
junction of atoms were studied in [14,7,2,9] and tight complexity bounds were
obtained (and in particular, the problem was proved to be decidable). In [15] a
subclass that contains disjunction and conjunction of atoms of the form ri ∼ νi
for ∼∈ {≥, >} was studied and decidability was shown. In [13] we considered a
similar objective but restricted player-1 to play only with finite-memory strate-
gies. We showed that the problem is provably hard to solve and its decidability is
inter-reducible with Hilbert’s tenth problem over rationals — a fundamental long
standing open problem. In this work we consider for the first time games with
robust quantitative class of specifications that is closed under boolean union,
intersection and complement with arbitrary (infinite-memory) strategies.
Undecidability for (single-dimensional) mean-payoff games was proved for
partial information mean-payoff games [10] and for mean-payoff games that are
played over infinite-state pushdown automata [8]. These works did not exploit
the different properties of the ≥ and ≤ operators (which correspond to the
different properties of limit-infimum-average and limit-supremum-average). To
the best of our knowledge, the undecidability proof in the paper is the first to
exploit these properties. (As we mentioned before, when we consider only the ≥
and > operators, the problem is decidable.)
Structure of this paper. In the next section we give the formal definitions
for robust multidimensional mean-payoff games. We prove undecidability by a
reduction from the halting problem of a two-counter machine. For this purpose
we first present a reduction from the halting problem of a one-counter machine
and then we extend it to two-counter machine. In Section 3 we present the
reduction and give an intuition about its correctness. In Section 4 we give a
formal proof for the correctness of the reduction and extend the reduction to
two-counter machine. In Section 5 we discuss the key elements of our proof and
apply the undecidability result for the similar model of mean-payoff expressions.
2 Robust Multidimensional Mean-Payoff Games
Game graphs. A game graph G = ((V,E), (V1, V2)) consists of a finite directed
graph (V,E) with a set of vertices V a set of edges E, and a partition (V1, V2) of
V into two sets. The vertices in V1 are player-1 vertices, where player 1 chooses
the outgoing edges, and the vertices in V2 are player 2 vertices, where player 2
(the adversary to player 1) chooses the outgoing edges. We assume that every
vertex has at least one out-going edge.
Plays. A game is played by two players: player 1 and player 2, who form an
infinite path in the game graph by moving a token along edges. They start by
placing the token on an initial vertex, and then they take moves indefinitely in
the following way. If the token is on a vertex in V1, then player 1 moves the
token along one of the edges going out of the vertex. If the token is on a vertex
3in V2, then player 2 does likewise. The result is an infinite path in the game
graph, called plays. Formally, a play is an infinite sequence of vertices such that
(vk, vk+1) ∈ E for all k ≥ 0.
Strategies. A strategy for a player is a rule that specifies how to extend plays.
Formally, a strategy τ for player 1 is a function τ : V ∗ ·V1 → V that, given a finite
sequence of vertices (representing the history of the play so far) which ends in a
player 1 vertex, chooses the next vertex. The strategy must choose only available
successors. The strategies for player 2 are defined analogously.
Multidimensional mean-payoff objectives. For multidimensional mean-payoff
objectives we will consider game graphs along with a weight function w : E → Qk
that maps each edge to a vector of rational weights. For a finite path π, we de-
note by w(π) the sum of the weight vectors of the edges in π and avg(π) =
w(π)
|π| , where |π| is the length of π, denote the average vector of the weights.
We denote by avg i(π) the projection of avg(π) to the i-th dimension. For an
infinite path π, let πi denote the finite prefix of length i of π; and we de-
fine LimInfAvg i(π) = lim infi→∞ avg(ρi) and analogously LimSupAvg i(π) with
lim inf replaced by lim sup. For an infinite path π, we denote by LimInfAvg(π) =
(LimInfAvg1(π), . . . ,LimInfAvgk(π)) (resp. LimSupAvg(π) = (LimSupAvg1(π), . . . ,LimSupAvgk(π)))
the limit-inf (resp. limit-sup) vector of the averages (long-run average or mean-
payoff objectives). A multidimensional mean-payoff condition is a boolean for-
mula over the atoms LimInfAvg i ∼ νi for ∼∈ {≥, >,≤, >}. For example, the
formula LimInfAvg1 > 8∨LimInfAvg2 ≤ −10∧LimInfAvg < 9 is a possible con-
dition and a path π satisfies the formula if LimInfAvg1(π) > 8∨LimInfAvg2(π) ≤
−10∧LimInfAvg(π) < 9. We note that we may always assume that the boolean
formula is positive (i.e., without negation), as, for example, we can always replace
¬(r ≥ ν) with r < ν.
For a given multidimensional weighted graph and a multidimensional mean-
payoff condition, we say that player 1 is the winner of the game if he has a
winning strategy that satisfy the condition against any player-2 strategy.
For an infinite sequence or reals x1, x2, x3, . . . we have LimInfAvg(x1, x2, . . . ) =
−LimSupAvg(−x1,−x2, . . . ). Hence, an equivalent formulation for multidimen-
sional mean-payoff condition is a positive boolean formula over the atoms LimInfAvg i ∼
νi and LimSupAvgi ∼ νi for ∼∈ {≥, >}. For positive formulas in which only the
LimInfAvg i ∼ νi occur, determining the winner is decidable by [15]. In the se-
quel we abbreviate LimInfAvg i with i and LimSupAvg i with i. In this work we
prove undecidability for the general case and for this purpose it is enough to
consider only the ≥ operator and thresholds 0. Hence, in the sequel, whenever
it is clear that the threshold is 0, we abbreviate the condition i ≥ 0 with i and
i ≥ 0 with i. For example, i ∨ j ∧ ℓ stands for LimInfAvg i ≥ 0 ∨ LimSupAvgj ≥
0∧LimInfAvgℓ ≥ 0. By further abuse of notation we abbreviate the current total
weight in dimension i by i (and make sure that the meaning of i is always clear
from the context) and the absolute value of the total weight by |i|.
43 Reduction from the Halting Problem and Informal
Proof of Correctness
In this work we prove the undecidability of determining the winner in games
over robust mean-payoff condition by a reduction from the halting problem of
two-counter machine. For this purpose we will first show a reduction from the
halting problem of a one-counter machine to robust mean-payoff games, and the
reduction from two-counter machines relays on similar techniques. We first give
a formal definition for a one-counter machine, and in order to simplify the proofs
we give a non-standard definition that is tailored for our needs. A two-sided one-
counter machine M consists of two finite set of control states, namely Q (left
states) and P (right states), an initial state q0 ∈ Q, a final state qf ∈ Q, a finite
set of left to right instructions δℓ→r and a finite set of right to left instructions
δr→ℓ. An instruction determines the next state and manipulates the value of the
counter c (and initially the value of c is 0). A left to right instruction is of the
form of either:
– q : if c = 0 goto p else c := c− 1 goto p′, for q ∈ Q and p, p′ ∈ P ; or
– q : goto p, for q ∈ Q and p ∈ P (the value of c does not change).
A right to left instruction is of the form of either
– p : c := c+ 1 goto q, for p ∈ P and q ∈ Q ; or
– p : goto q, for a state p ∈ P and a state q ∈ Q (the value of c does not
change).
We observe that in our model, decrement operations are allowed only in left
to right instructions and increment operations are allowed only in right to left
instructions. However, since the model allows state transitions that do not change
the value of the counter (nop transitions), it is trivial to simulate a standard
one-counter machine by a two-sided counter machine.
For the reduction we use the states of the game graph to simulate the states
of the counter machine and we use two dimensions to simulate the value of
the one counter. In the most high level view our reduction consists of three
main gadgets, namely, reset, sim and blame (see Figure 1), and a state qf that
represents the final state of the counter machine. Intuitively, in the sim gadget
player 1 simulates the counter machine, and if the final state qf is reached then
player 1 loses. If player 2 detects that player 1 does not simulate the machine
correctly, then the play goes to the blame gadget. From the blame gadget the
play will eventually arrive to the reset gadget. This gadget assign proper values
for all the dimensions of the game that are suited for an honest simulation in
the sim gadget.
We now describe the construction with more details. We first present the
winning objective and then we describe each of the three gadgets. For a two-
sided counter machineM we construct a game graph with 8 dimensions denoted
by ℓ, r, gs, c+, c−, gc, x and y and the objective
(ℓ ∧ r ∨ gs) ∧ (c+ ∧ c− ∨ gc) ∧ x ∧ y
5reset
sim
blame
qf
x← −1
Fig. 1. Overview.
The sim gadget In the sim gadget player 1 suppose to simulate the run of M ,
and if the simulation is not honest, then player 2 activates the blame gadget. The
simulation of the states is straight forward (since the game graph has states),
and the difficulty is to simulate the counter value, more specifically, to simulate
the zero testing of the counter. For this purpose we use the dimensions r, ℓ, gs
and c+, c−, gc.
We first describe the role of r, ℓ and gs. The reset gadget makes sure that in
every invocation of the sim gadget, we have
avg(gs) ≈ −1, avg(r) ≈ 1 and avg(ℓ) ≈ 0
(The reader should read a ≈ b as ”the value of a is very close to the value of
b”. Precise definitions are given in Section 4) Then, during the simulation, the
blame gadget makes sure that player 1 must play in such way that whenever the
machine M is in a right state, then
r ≈ |gs| and ℓ ≈ 0
and whenever the machine is in a left state, then
r ≈ 0 and ℓ ≈ |gs|
Intuitively, the role of ℓ and r is to make sure that every left to right or right to
left transition is simulated by a significant number of rounds in the sim gadget,
and gs is a guard dimension that make sure that the above assumptions on r
and ℓ are satisfied.
We now describe the role of c+, c− and gc. In the beginning of each simulation
(i.e., every time that the sim gadget is invoked), we have
avg(c+) ≈ avg(c−) ≈ 1 and avg(gc) ≈ −1
During the entire simulation we have avg(gc) ≈ −1 and if c is the value of the
counter in the current simulation (i.e., since the sim gadget was invoked), then
c+ ≈ |gc|+ |gs|c and c− ≈ |gc| − |gs|c
6Intuitively, whenever c > 0, then c− ≨ |gc|, and if c < 0 (this can happen only
if player 1 is dishonest), then c+ ≨ |gc|.
We now describe the gadgets that simulate the operations of inc, dec and
nop. The gadgets are illustrated in Figures 2-5 and the following conventions
are used: (i) Player 1 owns the # vertices, player 2 owns the ✷ vertices, and
the  vertex stands for a gadget; (ii) A transition is labeled either with a ← b
symbol or with a text (e.g., ”blame”). For a transition e the label a← b stands
for wa(e) = b. Whenever the weight of a dimension is not explicitly presented,
then the weight is 0. We use text labels only to give intuition on the role of the
transition. In such transitions the weights of all dimensions are 0.
In the first state of every inc, dec or nop gadget, in a left to right transition,
player 1 loops until ℓ ≈ 0 and r ≈ gs, and in a right to left transition he loops
until r ≈ 0 and ℓ ≈ gs. Then, player 2 decides whether he wants to blame
player 1 for violating the assumptions about the values of ℓ, r and gs.
nop
r ← −1, ℓ ← 1
c+ ← 1, c− ← 1
gc ← −1,
side?
blame r → ℓ
blame
ok
Fig. 2. nop r → ℓ gadget.
nop
r ← 1, ℓ ← −1
c+ ← 1, c− ← 1
gc ← −1,
side?
blame ℓ→ r
blame
ok
Fig. 3. nop ℓ→ r gadget.
dec
r ← 1, ℓ ← −1
c+ ← 0, c− ← 2
gc ← −1,
side?
blame ℓ→ r
blame
ok
Fig. 4. dec ℓ→ r gadget.
inc
r ← −1, ℓ ← 1
c+ ← 2, c− ← 0
gc ← −1,
side?
blame r → ℓ
blame
ok
Fig. 5. inc r → ℓ gadget.
A transition q : if c = 0 goto p else c := c−1 goto p′, for q ∈ Q and p, p′ ∈ P
is described in Figure 6.
The blame gadgets The role of the blame gadgets is to make sure that
the assumptions on ℓ, r and gs are kept in the simulation and to make sure
that the zero testing is honestly simulated. There are four blame gadgets. Two
for the honest simulation of r, ℓ and gs, and two for the zero testing (one for
7p
p′
q
c > 0?blame c > 0
blame
declare c = 0 nop ℓ→ r
ok
dec ℓ→ rdeclare c > 0 c < 0?blame c < 0
ok
blame
Fig. 6. q : if c = 0 then goto p else c := c− 1 goto p′
c > 0 and one for c < 0). The gadgets are described in Figures 8-10. The
concept of all four gadgets is similar and hence we describe only the blame gad-
get for the left to right transition. We note that in an honest simulation we
have avg(r), avg(ℓ), avg(c+), avg(c−), avg(x), avg(y) ' 0 in every round. Hence,
if player 1 honestly simulates M and M does not halt, then the winning condi-
tion is satisfied. The blame gadget for the left to right transition is described in
Figure 10. If the gadget is invoked and r ≨ gs, then player 2 can loop on the first
state until avg(r) ≨ 0 and still have avg(gs) ≨ 0. If r ≈ gs, then whenever we
have avg(r) ≨ 0 we will also have avg(gs) ' 0, and thus the winning objective
is still satisfied. If r ≩ gs, then we must have avg(ℓ) ≨ 0. In this case, player 2
will immediately go to the reset gadget. We note that player 2 should eventually
exit the blame gadget, since otherwise he will lose the game.
c− ← −1, gc ← 1
reset
Fig. 7. blame c > 0 gadget.
c+ ← −1, gc ← 1
reset
Fig. 8. blame c < 0 gadget.
The reset gadget The role of the reset gadget is to assign the following values
for the dimensions:
avg(ℓ) ≈ 0, avg(r) ≈ 1, avg(gs) ≈ −1, avg(c−) ≈ avg(c+) ≈ 1, avg(gc) ≈ −1
The gadget is described in Figure 11. We construct the gadget is such way that
each of the players can enforce the above values (player 2 by looping enough
8ℓ ← −1, gs ← 1
reset
Fig. 9. blame r → ℓ gadget.
r ← −1, gs ← 1
reset
Fig. 10. blame ℓ→ r gadget.
time on the first state, player 1 by looping enough time on his two states). But
the construction only gives this option to the players and it does not punish a
player if he acts differently. However, the game graph is constructed in such way
that if:
– M does not halt and in the reset gadget (at least one of the players) correctly
reset the values, then player 1 wins.
– M halts and in the reset gadget (at least one of the players) correctly reset
the values, then player 2 wins.
Hence, if M does halts, then player 2 winning strategy will make sure that the
reset assigns correct values, and ifM halts, then we can relay on player 1 to reset
the values. We note that player 2 will not stay forever in his state (otherwise he
will lose). In order to make sure that player 1 will not stay forever in one of his
states we introduce two liveness dimensions, namely x and y. In the simulation
and blame gadgets they get 0 values. But if player 1 remains forever in one of
his two states in the reset gadget, then either x or y will have negative lim-sup
value and player 1 will lose. Hence, in the reset gadget, player 1 should not only
reset the values, but also assign a positive value for y and then a positive value
for x.
r ← 1, ℓ ← 0
c+ ← 1, c− ← 1
gs ← −1, gc ← −1
r ← 1, ℓ ← 0
c+ ← 1, c− ← 1
gs ← −1, gc ← −1
x ← −1, y ← 1
r ← 1, ℓ ← 0
c+ ← 1, c− ← 1
gs ← −1, gc ← −1
x ← 1, y ← −1
sim
Fig. 11. Reset gadget.
Correctness of the reduction We claim that player 1 has a winning strategy
if and only if the machine M does not halt. We first prove that if M halts, then
player 2 has a winning strategy (the proof is informal, and a formal proof is given
in Section 4). The winning strategy for player 2 is as follows: In the reset gadget
9make sure that the reset invariants are satisfied. This is done by looping the first
state of the reset gadget for enough rounds. In the sim gadget, whenever the sim
invariants are not fulfilled or whenever player 1 cheats a zero-test, then player 2
invokes the blame gadget. If the sim invariants are fulfilled, then it must be the
case that the game reaches state qf , and in that case player 2 wins. Otherwise,
in each simulation, the guard dimensions have negative average weights, while
at least one of the dimensions ℓ, r, c+ or c− has a negative average weight in the
blame gadget. Hence, we get that gs, gc < 0 and ℓ < 0 or r < 0 or c− < 0 or
c+ < 0. Hence, the winning condition is not satisfied and player 2 is the winner.
To prove the converse direction we assume that M never halts and describe
a winning strategy for player 1. The winning strategy is to honestly simulate
M while keeping the sim invariants and the reset invariants. If player 2 never
invokes the blame gadget, then the winning condition is trivially satisfied (since
the game stays forever in the sim gadget). Otherwise, after every invocation of
the blame gadget, if a side blame gadget was invoked, then either the average
value of r and ℓ is non-negative or the value of the guard dimension gs is non-
negative. Hence, eventually, we get that r, ℓ ≥ 0 or gs ≥ 0. And similarly, we get
that c+, c− ≥ 0 or gc ≥ 0. Thus, the winning condition is satisfied, and player 1
is the winner.
4 Detailed Proof
In the previous section we accurately described the reduction, and only the
proof of the correctness was informal. In this section we give a precise proof for
the correctness of the reduction, namely, we formally describe player-2 winning
strategy in the case thatM halts (Subsection 4.1), and player-1 winning strategy
in the case that M does not halt (Subsection 4.2). In Subsection 4.3 we extend
the reduction to two-counter machine.
In the next subsections we use the next notations and definitions: A round is
a round in the game graph (i.e., either player-1 or player-2 move). A simulation
step denote all the rounds that are played in a transition gadget (i.e., in a nop,inc
or dec gadget). The total number of rounds is the total number of rounds from
the beginning of the play.
4.1 If M halts, then player 2 is the winner
In this subsection we assume thatM halts. We denote by N the number of steps
after which M halts (for initial counter value 0) and we denote ǫ = 1(N+1)2 .
WLOG we assume that N > 10. The strategy of player 2 in the reset gadget is
to achieve the following reset invariants (after the play leaves the gadget):
– avg(gs), avg(gc) ≤ −
1
2
– (1− ǫ4 )|gs| ≤ r ≤ (1 +
ǫ
4 )|gs|
– − ǫ4 |gs| ≤ ℓ ≤
ǫ
4 |gs|
– (1− ǫ4 )|gc| ≤ c+, c− ≤ (1 +
ǫ
4 )|gc|
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We note that player 2 can maintain the above by looping sufficiently long time
in the first state, and once the invariants are reached, player 1 cannot violate
them in his states in the reset gadget (since the average value of gs and gc can
only get closer to −1, the average value of ℓ only gets closer to 0 and the average
value of r, c− and c+ only gets closer to 1).
The strategy of player 2 in the sim gadget is to maintain, in every step of the
simulation, the next two invariants, which we denote by the left right invariants :
– (Left state invariant) If the machine is in a left state, then (1− ǫ)|gs| ≤ ℓ ≤
(1 + ǫ)|gs| and −ǫ|gs| ≤ r ≤ ǫ|gs|.
– (Right state invariant) If the machine is in a right state, then (1 − ǫ)|gs| ≤
r ≤ (1 + ǫ)|gs| and −ǫ|gs| ≤ ℓ ≤ +ǫ|gs|
We denote δ = 11
2
+N(1+2ǫ)
. We first prove that under these invariants avg(gs) ≤
−δ. Then we use this fact to show that if player 1 violates these invariants, then
player 2 can violate (ℓ ∧ r ∨ gs), and therefore he wins.
Lemma 1 Suppose that after the reset gadget avg(gs) ≤ −
1
2 , then as long as the
left right invariants are maintained, it always hold that avg(gs) ≤ −δ (provided
that the sim gadget does not simulate more than N steps).
Proof. We denote by R the number of rounds that were played before the current
invocation of the simulation gadget. We claim that after simulating i steps of
the machine (in the current invocation of the sim gadget), the total number
of rounds in the play (i.e., number of rounds from the beginning of the play,
not from the beginning of the current invocation) is at most R+ i · |gs|(1 + 2ǫ).
The proof is by a simple induction, and for the base case i = 0 the proof is
trivial. For i > 0, we assume WLOG that the i-th transition is a left-to-right
transition. Hence, before the last simulation step we had r ≥ −ǫ|gs| and after the
i-th step was completed we have r ≤ (1 + ǫ)|gs|. Since in every round the value
of r is incremented by 1, we get that at most (1 + 2ǫ)|gs| rounds were played
and the proof of the claim follows (and the proof for a right-to-left transition is
symmetric).
Hence, after N simulation steps we have
avg(gs) ≤
gs
R+N |gs|(1 + 2ǫ)
Since in the beginning of the sim gadget we had avg(gs) ≤ −
1
2 , then R ≤
|gs|
2 .
Hence, and since gs < 0 we get
avg(gs) ≤
gs
|gs|
2 +N |gs|(1 + 2ǫ)
= −
1
1
2 +N(1 + 2ǫ)
= −δ
We note that unless the blame gadget is invoked, the value of gs is not
changed in the simulation gadget. Hence, avg(gs) gets the maximal value after
the N -th step and the proof is complete. ✷
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Lemma 2 Let γ = min( ǫδ2 ,
ǫ
4
1+ 1
δ
− ǫ
4
). If player 1 violates the left-right invari-
ants in the first N steps of a simulation, then player 2 can achieve in the
blame gadget either avg(r) ≤ −γ or avg(ℓ) ≤ −γ (or both) while maintaining
avg(gs), avg(gc) ≤ −γ.
Proof. We prove the assertion for the left-state invariant and the proof for the
right-state is symmetric. Recall that the invariant consistences of four assump-
tions, namely, (i) (1 − ǫ)|gs| ≤ ℓ; (ii) ℓ ≤ (1 + ǫ)|gs|; (iii) −ǫ|gs| ≤ r; and
(iv) r ≤ ǫ|gs|. We first prove the assertion when the first condition is violated,
i.e., we assume that ℓ < (1− ǫ)|gs|. If this is the case after a right-to-left transi-
tion, then player 2 will invoke the blame r→ ℓ gadget after the transition ends.
In the blame gadget he will traverse the self-loop for X · (1− ǫ2 ) times, where X
is the value of |gs| before the invocation of the blame gadget, and then he will
go to the reset gadget. As a result (since in every loop ℓ is decremented by 1
and gs is incremented by 1) we get that the value of ℓ and gs is at most −X ·
ǫ
2 .
By Lemma 1 we know that before the invocation of the blame gadget we had
avg(gs) ≤ −δ. Hence, if R is the number of rounds before the invocation of the
blame gadget, then R ≤ X
δ
. Hence, after the blame gadget ends, we have
avg(ℓ), avg(gs) ≤ −
X · ǫ2
R+X · (1− ǫ2 )
≤ −
X · ǫ2
X
δ
+X · (1 − ǫ2 )
= −
ǫ
2
1 + 1
δ
− ǫ2
If the second condition is violated, namely, if ℓ > (1 + ǫ)|gs|, then we claim
that it must be the case that r < − ǫ|gs|2 . Indeed, when the sim gadget is invoked
we have r ≤ |gs|(1+
ǫ
4 ) and ℓ ≤ |gs|
ǫ
4 . In the sim gadget the value of the sum r+ℓ
is not changed (since r is incremented only when ℓ is decremented and vise versa).
Hence, the sum never exceeds |gs|(1 +
ǫ
2 ). Thus, if ℓ > (1 + ǫ)|gs|, then it must
be the case that r < − ǫ|gs|2 and we get that avg(r) ≤ −
ǫ
2δ. Hence, by leaving
the blame gadget after two rounds we get avg(r) ≤ − ǫδ2 while avg(gs) ≤ −δ.
If the third condition is violated, namely, if r < −ǫ|gs|, then avg(r) =
−ǫ|avg(gs)| ≤ −ǫδ. Hence, if player 2 can choose to exit the blame gadget after
two rounds and we get avg(r) ≤ −ǫδ while avg(gs) ≤ −δ.
Finally, if the fourth condition is violated, namely, if r > ǫ|gs|, then by
analyzing the sum r+ ℓ we get that ℓ ≤ (1− ǫ2 )|gs|. We repeat the same analysis
as in the case where the first invariant is violated (i.e., when ℓ ≤ (1− ǫ)|gs|) and
get that
avg(gs), avg(r) ≤ −
ǫ
4
1 + 1
δ
− ǫ4
It is an easy observation that if at beginning of the last invocation of the sim
gadget avg(gc) ≤ −
1
2 , then it remains at most −
1
2 as it gets a value of −1 in
every round. The proof is complete. ✷
By Lemma 2, if player 2 maintains the reset invariant in the reset gadget, then
in every simulation player 1 must satisfy the left-right invariants. Otherwise, we
get that infinitely often the average value of either r or ℓ is −γ while the average
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value of gs is always at most −γ. Hence gs < 0 and either r < 0 or ℓ < 0 and
thus the condition (ℓ ∧ r ∨ gs) is violated and therefore player 1 is losing.
In the next three lemmas we prove that player 1 must honestly simulates the
zero-testing. The first lemma is a simple corollary from the left-right invariants.
Lemma 3 Under the left-right invariants, in the dec,inc and nop gadgets, player 1
follows the self-loop of the first state at most |gs|(1 + 2ǫ) rounds and at least
|gs|(1− 2ǫ) rounds.
Proof. Upper bound: in a left to right transition, we have ℓ ≤ |gs|(1+ǫ) before the
transition and ℓ ≥ −|gs|ǫ after the transition, and in every round ℓ is decremented
by 1. Lower bound: in a left to right transition, we have ℓ ≥ |gs|(1− ǫ) before the
transition and ℓ ≤ |gs|ǫ after the transition, and in every round ℓ is decremented
by 1.
The proof for a right to left transition is symmetric.
The next lemma shows the correlation between gc and c+ and c−.
Lemma 4 Let #inc (resp., #dec) be the number of times that the inc (dec)
gadget was visited, and we denote c = #inc−#dec (namely, c is the actual value
of the counter in the counter machine M). Then under the left-right invariants,
in the first N steps of the simulation we always have c+ ≤ |gc|(1+ǫ)+c|gs|+
|gs|
2
and c− ≤ |gc|(1 + ǫ)− c|gs|+
|gs|
2 .
Proof. We prove the claim of the lemma for c+ and the proof for c− is symmetric.
Let X be the value of |gc| when the sim gadget is invoked. By the reset invariants
we get that c+ ≤ X(1+
ǫ
4 ). By Lemma 3 we get that every visit in the inc gadget
contributes at most |gs|(1+2ǫ) more to c+ than its contribution to gc and every
visit in the dec contributes at least |gs|(1−2ǫ) more to to gc than its contribution
to c+. Hence,
c+ ≤ X(1 +
ǫ
4 ) + (|gc| −X) + #inc · |gs|(1 + 2ǫ)−#dec · |gs|(1− 2ǫ) =
|gc|+ ǫX + (#inc −#dec)|gs|(1 + 2ǫ) + 4ǫ|gs| ·#dec
We recall that c = (#inc − #dec), and observe that X ≤ |gc|, and that
#dec ≤ N and thus ǫ·#dec < 110 . Hence, we get that c+ ≤ |gc|(1+ǫ)+c|gs|+
|gs|
2 .
✷
The next lemma suggest that player 1 must honestly simulates the zero-tests.
Lemma 5 If the reset and left-right invariants hold, then for γ = min( 120N ,
δ
8 )
the following hold: (i) if the blame c < 0 is invoked and c < 0 then player 2 can
achieve c+ ≤ −γ while maintaining avg(gs), avg(gc) ≤ −γ; and (ii) if the blame
c > 0 is invoked and c > 0 then player 2 can achieve c− ≤ −γ while maintaining
avg(gs), avg(gc) ≤ −γ.
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Proof. We prove the first item of the lemma and the proof for the second item is
symmetric. Suppose that c < 0 (i.e., c ≤ −1) when blame c < 0 gadget is invoked.
Let X and Y be the values of |gc| and |gs| before the invocation of the blame
gadget. Then by Lemma 4, before the invocation we have c+ ≤ X(1 + ǫ) −
Y
2 .
Hence, by traversing the self-loop in the first state of the blame c < 0 gadget for
X(1+ ǫ)− Y4 rounds we get c+ ≤ −
Y
4 and gc ≤ ǫX−
Y
4 . Let R be the number of
rounds that were played from the beginning of the play (and not just from the
beginning of the current invocation of the sim gadget). Since gc is decremented
by at most 1 in every round we get that X(1 + ǫ)− Y4 ≤ 2X ≤ 2R. By lemma 1
we have Y
R
≤ −δ. Hence, avg(c+) ≤
c+
2R ≤ −
Y
8R ≤ −
δ
8 . Similarly, since
X
R
is
bounded by 1, we have avg(gc) ≤
ǫX
2R −
δ
8 ≤
ǫ
2 −
δ
8 . Recall that δ =
1
1
2
+N(1+2ǫ)
.
Hence, avg(gc) ≤
2ǫ+4Nǫ+8ǫ2−1
8( 1
2
+N(1+2ǫ))
and since ǫ = 1(N+1)2 and N > 10 we get that
avg(gc) ≤ −
1
20N . The value of gs was at most −δR before the blame gadget, and
in the blame gadget gs is decreased by 1 in every round. Hence avg(gs) ≤ −δ
and the proof follows by taking γ = min( 120N ,
δ
8 ). ✷
We are now ready to prove one side of the reduction.
Proposition 1 If the counter machine M halts, then player 2 has a winning
strategy for violating (ℓ ∧ r ∨ gs) ∧ (c+ ∧ c− ∨ gc) ∧ x ∧ y. Moreover, if M halts
then there exists a constant ζ > 0 that depends only on M such that player 2 has
a winning strategy for violating (ℓ ≥ −ζ ∧ r ≥ −ζ ∨ gs ≥ −ζ)∧ (c+ ≥ −ζ ∧ c− ≥
−ζ ∨ gc ≥ −ζ) ∧ x ≥ −ζ ∧ y ≥ −ζ.
Proof. Suppose that M halts and let N be the number of steps that M runs
before it halts (for an initial counter value 0). Player-2 strategy is to
– Maintain the reset-invariants.
– Whenever the left-right invariants are violated, he invokes the blame r → ℓ
or ℓ→ r gadget.
– Whenever the zero-testing is dishonest, he activates the corresponding blame
gadget (either c > 0 or c < 0).
– If qf is reached, he stays there forever.
The correctness of the construction is immediate by the lemmas above. We first
observe that it is possible for player 2 to satisfy the reset-invariants and that if
player 1 stays in the reset gadget forever, then he loses.
Whenever the left-right invariant is violated, then the average weight of r
and/or ℓ is negative, while the average weight of gs and gc remains negative.
Hence, if in every simulation player 1 violates the left-right invariants in the
first N steps we get that the condition is violated since gs ≤ −γ and either
r ≤ −γ or ℓ ≤ −γ. Hence, we may assume that these invariants are kept in
every simulation.
Whenever the zero-testing is dishonest (while the left-right invariants are
satisfied), then by Lemma 5, player 2 can invoke a counter blame gadget and
achieve negative average for either c+ or c− while maintaining gc and gs negative.
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If in every simulation player 1 is dishonest in zero-testing, then we get that either
c− ≤ −γ or c+ ≤ −γ while gc ≤ −γ and the condition is violated. Hence, we may
assume that player 1 honestly simulates the zero-tests. Finally, if the transitions
of M are properly simulated, then it must be the case the state qf is reached
and when looping this state forever player 1 loses (since x ≤ −1 < 0). ✷
4.2 If M does not halt, then player 1 is the winner
Suppose that M does not halt. The strategy of player 1 in the reset gadget is as
following: Let i be the number of times that the reset gadget was visited, and
we denote ǫi =
1
i+10 . Similarly to player-2 strategy in Subsection 4.1, player-1
strategy in the reset gadget is to achieve the following invariants (after the play
leaves the gadget):
– avg(gs), avg(gc) ≤ −
1
2
– (1− ǫi4 )|gs| ≤ r ≤ (1 +
ǫi
4 )|gs|
– − ǫi|gs|4 ≤ ℓ ≤
ǫi|gs|
4
– (1− ǫi4 )|gc| ≤ c+, c− ≤ (1 +
ǫi
4 )|gc|
To satisfy these invariants, he follows the self-loop of his first state until avg(y) ≥
0 and then follows the self-loop of the second state until the invariants are
fulfilled and avg(x) ≥ 0. In the sim gadget, player-1 strategy is to simulate every
nop,inc and dec step by following the self-loop in the corresponding gadget for
|gs| rounds. In addition, player 1 honestly simulates the zero-tests.
We denote the above player-1 strategy by τ and next lemma shows the basic
properties of a play according to τ .
Lemma 6 In any play according to τ , after the reset gadget was visited for i
times, in the sim gadget we always have: (i) In a right state: r ≥ −ǫi|gs|, ℓ ≥
(1 − ǫi)|gs| and in a left state ℓ ≥ −ǫi|gs|, r ≥ (1 − ǫi)|gs|; and (ii) c+ ≥ (1 −
ǫi)|gc|+ c|gs| and c− ≥ (1− ǫi)|gc|− c|gs|, where c = #inc−#dec in the current
invocation of the sim gadget.
Proof. The proof of the first item is straight forward. Initially, when the sim
gadget is invoked (and starts in a left state) we have −ǫi|gs| ≤ ℓ ≤ ǫi|gs| and
(1−ǫi)|gs| ≤ r ≤ (1+ǫi)|gs|. In every left to right transition r is decremented by
|gs| and ℓ is incremented by |gs|. In every right to left transition ℓ is decremented
by |gs| and r is incremented by |gs|. Hence, the proof of the first item follows.
In order to prove the second item we denote by K the value of |gc| when the
sim gadget is invoked. Initially we have c+ ≥ (1 − ǫi)K. After every simulation
step we have c+ ≥ (1− ǫi)K + |gs|(2#inc +#nop) and |gc| = K + |gs|(#inc +
#dec +#nop). Hence, c+ ≥ (1− ǫi)|gc| + c|gs|. The proof for c− is symmetric.
✷
We will use the next lemma to prove that player 2 is losing when he invokes
the blame gadgets.
Lemma 7 In a play prefix consistent with τ :
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1. In the blame r → ℓ gadget: whenever avg(ℓ) ≤ −ǫi, then avg(gs) ≥ −ǫi.
2. In the blame ℓ→ r gadget: whenever avg(r) ≤ −ǫi, then avg(gs) ≥ −ǫi.
3. In the blame c < 0 gadget: whenever avg(c+) ≤ −ǫi, then avg(gc) ≥ −ǫi.
4. In the blame c > 0 gadget: whenever avg(c−) ≤ −ǫi, then avg(gc) ≥ −ǫi.
Where i is the number of times that the reset gadget was visited.
Proof. Proof of item 1: By Lemma 6 we know that when blame r → ℓ gadget is
invoked, the value of ℓ is at least (1−ǫi)|gs|. Let R be the total number of rounds
that were played before the blame gadget was invoked, and by Y the value of
|gs| before the invocation of the blame gadget. In order to obtain avg(ℓ) ≤ −ǫi,
player 1 should follow the self-loop of the gadget at least X = (1−ǫi)Y+Rǫi1−ǫi
rounds. In every such round the value of gs is incremented by 1. We note that
X ≥ Y . Hence, after X rounds we have gs = −Y + X ≥ 0 and in particular
avg(gs) ≥ −ǫi.
Proof of item 2: Symmetric to the proof of item 1.
Proof of item 3: By Lemma 7 we know that before the invocation of the blame
gadget we have c+ ≥ (1− ǫi)|gc|+c|gs|. Since τ honestly simulates the zero-tests
we get that c ≥ 0. Hence, c+ ≥ (1 − ǫi)|gc|. Thus, by the same arguments as in
the proof of item 1 we get that if avg(c+) ≤ −ǫi, then avg(gc) ≥ 0 ≥ −ǫi.
Proof of item 4: By Lemma 7 we know that before the invocation of the
blame gadget we have c− ≥ (1 − ǫi)|gc| − c|gs|. Since τ honestly simulates the
zero-tests we get that c = 0. The rest of the proof is symmetric to the proof of
item 3. ✷
We are now ready to prove the τ is a winning strategy.
Proposition 2 If M does not halt, then τ is a winning strategy.
Proof. In order to prove that τ satisfies the condition (ℓ∧r∨gs)∧(c+∧c−∨gc)∧x∧
y it is enough to prove that when playing according to τ , for any constant δ > 0
the condition (ℓ ≥ −δ∧r ≥ −δ∨gs ≥ −δ)∧(c+ ≥ −δ∧c− ≥ −δ∨gc ≥ −δ)∧x∧y
is satisfied.
Let δ > 0 be an arbitrary constant and in order to prove the claim we consider
two distinct cases.
In the first case, player 2 strategy will invoke the blame gadgets only finitely
many times. Hence, either there is a suffix that is played only in a blame gadget
or only in a reset gadget (and in such suffixes player 2 loses) or there is an
infinite suffix that is played only in the sim gadget (as M does not halt). In the
sim gadget the values of x, y and gs are not changed. Hence the long-run average
weight of these dimensions is 0. In addition, c+ and c− are never decremented
in the sim gadget. Hence, their long-run average weight is also at least 0. Thus,
the condition is satisfied.
In the second case we consider, player 2 always eventually invokes a blame
gadget. Since a blame gadget is invoked infinitely many times we get that the
reset gadget is invoked infinitely often, and thus x, y ≥ 0. In addition, the sim
gadget is invoked infinitely often. Let i be the minimal index for which ǫi ≤ δ. We
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claim that after the i-th invocation of the sim gadget, in every round (i) either
avg(ℓ) ≥ −ǫi ∧ avg(r) ≥ −ǫi or avg(gs) ≥ −ǫi; and (ii) either avg(c+) ≥ −ǫi ∧
avg(c+) ≥ −ǫi or avg(gc) ≥ −ǫi. The proof for the first item follows from the
reset invariants, from Lemma 6 (as r, ℓ ≥ −ǫi|gs| and |avg(gs)| ≤ 1) and from
Lemma 7 (and from the fact that r and ℓ are never decremented in the reset
gadget). The proof for the second item follows from the reset invariants, from the
fact that c+ and c− are never decremented in the sim gadget and from Lemma 7
(and from the fact that c+ and c− are never decremented in the reset gadget).
Thus, from certain round, either avg(ℓ) and avg(r) are always at least −δ, or
infinitely often avg(gs) ≥ −δ. Hence, (ℓ ≥ −δ ∧ r ≥ −δ ∨ gs ≥ −δ) is satisfied
and similarly (c+ ≥ −δ∧c− ≥ −δ∨gc ≥ −δ) is satisfied. Therefore, since ǫi ≤ δ,
we get that τ satisfies (ℓ ≥ −δ∧ r ≥ −δ∨ gs ≥ −δ)∧ (c+ ≥ −δ∧ c− ≥ −δ∨ gc ≥
−δ) ∧ x ∧ y. ✷
4.3 Extending the reduction to two-counter machine
WhenM is a two-counter machine, we use 4 dimensions for the counters, namely
c1+, c
1
−, c
2
+, c
2
− and one guard dimension gc. The winning condition is (ℓ∧r∨gs)∧
(c1+∧c
1
−∧c
2
+∧c
2
−∨gc)∧x∧y. In a nop gadget all four dimensions c
1
+, c
1
−, c
2
+, c
2
−
get a value of 1 in the self-loop. When a counter ci (for i = 1, 2) is incremented
(resp., decremented), then counter ci+ and c
i
− are assigned with weights according
to the weights of c+ and c− in the inc (dec) gadget that we described in the
reduction for a one counter machine, and c3−i+ , c
3−i
− are assigned with weights
according to a nop gadget.
The proofs of Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 easily scale to a two-counter
machine. Hence, the undecidability result is obtained.
Theorem 1 The problem of deciding the winner in a robust multidimensional
mean-payoff game with ten dimensions is undecidable.
5 Discussion
Additional intuition. Previous undecidability results for mean-payoff games
relied on a reduction from the universality problem of a non-deterministic weighted
automaton over finite-words. In such setting, the input for the automaton is a
run of a counter machine and the automaton verifies that the run is valid. The
non-determinism allows the automaton to decide after the run ends whether (i) it
simulates the first counter or the second counter; and (ii) whether a dishonest
zero-test was done for a positive counter or for a zero counter.
In our reduction player 2 must identify dishonest simulation during the run
and he does not know in advance whether a dishonest zero-test will be done
for the first counter or for the second counter. Hence, if we would apply the
standard technique, then one run that is dishonest for the first counter might
fix the mean-payoff of a previous run that was dishonest for the second counter.
For this purpose we introduce the reset gadget that in a way clears the affect of
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previous simulations. However, with the reset gadget the affect of the rounds that
are played in the simulation gadget becomes neglectable. For this purpose we
introduce the notion of left-to-right and right-to-left transitions who make sure
that every simulation step takes a non-neglectable fraction of the run. Both the
reset gadget and the blame gadgets crucially relies on the combination of limit-
supremum-average and limit-infimum-average objectives. Indeed, games over the
condition (ℓ ∧ r ∨ gs) ∧ (c
1
+ ∧ c
1
− ∧ c
2
+ ∧ c
2
− ∨ gc) ∧ x ∧ y or the condition (ℓ ∧ r ∨
gs) ∧ (c1+ ∧ c
1
− ∧ c
2
+ ∧ c
2
− ∨ gc) ∧ x ∧ y are decidable [15].
Undecidability for Similar Objectives Alur et al [1] considered the same
objectives as in this work. Boker et al. [3] and Tomita et al. [11] extended Alur
et al objectives with boolean temporal logic. Hence, the undecidability result
trivially holds for their model.
Chatterjee et al. [6] considered a quantitative objective that assigns a (one-
dimensional) real value to the vectors LimInfAvg(π) and LimSupAvg(π). In their
framework an atomic expression is LimInfAvgi and LimSupAvgi and a mean-
payoff expression is the closure under the min,max and sum operators and under
the numerical complement (multiplication by −1). For example, the value of the
expression E = LimInfAvg1 + max(LimInfAvg2,LimSupAvg3) for an infinite
path π is LimInfAvg1(π)+max(LimInfAvg2(π),LimSupAvg3(π)). As the objec-
tive is quantitative and not boolean, there are three problem that are relevant
to games for a given expression E: (i) Can player 1 assure E ≥ ν?; (ii) Can
player 1 assure E > ν?; and (iii) What is the maximal (supremum) value the
player 1 can assure? In [13] we proved that when player 1 is restricted to finite-
memory strategies, then the decidability of the first problem is inter-reducible
with Hilbert’s Tenth problem over rationals (a long standing open problem),
but the second problem is decidable and the third problem is computable. For
arbitrary (infinite-memory) strategies we can easily extend our undecidability
proof from Section 3 and 4 and get the next theorem:
Theorem 2 Two-player games over mean-payoff expression are undecidable.
Proof. Consider the construction from Section 3 and the expressions
E1 = max(min(LimInfAvg ℓ,LimInfAvgr),LimSupAvggs),
E2 = max(min(LimInfAvgc1
+
,LimInfAvgc1
−
,LimInfAvgc2
+
,LimInfAvgc2
−
),LimSupAvggc),
E3 = min(LimSupAvgx,LimSupAvgy), E = min(E1, E2, E3) and F = −E, and
the boolean formula ϕ = (ℓ ∧ r ∨ gs) ∧ (c
1
+ ∧ c
1
− ∧ c
2
+ ∧ c
2
− ∨ gc) ∧ x ∧ y. It is
a trivial observation that for any play π: (i) ϕ is satisfied iff E(π) ≥ 0; and
(ii) ϕ is not satisfied iff F (π) > 0. Hence, we have a reduction from determining
whether player 1 wins for robust multidimensional mean-payoff games to mean-
payoff expression games with weak inequality, and a reduction from determining
whether player 2 wins for robust multidimensional mean-payoff games to mean-
payoff expression games with strong inequality. Moreover, by Proposition 1 it
follows that if player 1 cannot satisfy E ≥ 0, then for some ζ > 0 he cannot
satisfy E ≥ −ζ. Hence if we could compute the maximal (supremum) value that
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player 1 can assure we could determine whether he wins for E ≥ 0 (if the value
is negative, then he loses, and otherwise he wins). ✷
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